We can hold as self-evident at least one truth about globalization, past or present. People everywhere meet what comes to them over the horizon with neither passive acceptance nor heroic resistance. This unhappy and limited choice-like the unmediated opposition between ''the local/ indigenous'' and ''the global/foreign''-is a consequence of bipolar theory rather than ethnographic and historical inquiry. So the articles gathered here forcefully demonstrate. Pacific Islanders now seek and have long sought to establish a range of relationships with agents and agencies deemed foreign. Relationship is the key term; the transformative engagement of the foreign by the domestic is above all oriented toward generating a productive and reciprocal relationship. Such relationships have assumed multiple shapes of varying symmetry, including ones in which neither side concedes its autonomy and both sides achieve their aspirations-a durable relationship between sovereign partners; ones in which each side accommodates the other from their proper positions within an encompassing hierarchy; and ones in which both sides merge or incorporate to form new conditions for social existence.
specifically, I propose that we appreciate these articles, individually and together, for what they tell us about three overlapping kinds of negotiations: with gifts, with contracts, and with nations. For it is through these negotiations that Pacific Islanders enact their desires and make history, not as the unfolding of a singular world-historical narrative, but as the contingent outcomes of plural social situations.
Negotiating Gifts (and Commodities)
Martha Kaplan's article makes it clear that the meanings of such jural terms as ownership and profit have shifted recently for at least some Fijians. Previously, many ethnic Fijians partook of a widespread Pacific auto-orientalism that associated commercial enterprise with a foreign and morally inferior ''way of money'' distinctly opposed to an indigenous and traditional ''way of the land.'' Ethnic Fijians thus echoed Marcel Mauss. Facilitated by colonial and postcolonial land policies, they construed themselves as virtuous practitioners of a gift society and both Europeans and Indo-Fijians as emissaries of a dehumanizing commodity society. Current circumstances, however, have enabled some nonchiefly ethnic Fijians to domesticate the ''foreign god'' of profit while remaining within the discursive logic of the gift relationship. The strategy of the Vatukaloko people, for example, revises the strategy of their ancestor Navosavakadua, who localized the power of Christianity by attributing it to ultimate Fijian origins: Jesus and Jehovah were Fijian gods. Likewise, Navosavakadua's descendants have been able to domesticate Natural Waters of Viti (Fiji), Ltd. by recasting the sacred land on which the foreign-owned company operates as the gift of the Vatukaloko people to the Fijian national economy-a gift from which the Vatukaloko people might legitimately expect returns. 1 By these means, land rendered inalienable by colonial custom functions nevertheless as an effective investment, a source of profit not in the form of an alienable commodity but rather of an originating gift. Navosavakadua's recognition that power is, in the last instance, autochthonous would come as no surprise to Dakoa, whose cult followers see in the foreign imports of colonialism, Christianity, and capitalism manifestations of an underground world of dead relatives, ancestral heroes, and local(ized) spirits. Like the Vatukaloko people, Dakoa and his followers have struggled to domesticate the ''profits'' that ''companies'' create by locating value-producing activity within a relationship of sacrifice and mutual care. Dakoa posits his own Perukuma Company as a morally superior religious/economic organization, the institutional vehicle for moderating and overcoming the exploitation and inequality of colo-nial race relations. Making copra for Perukuma Company-the poorly compensated hard work of commodity production-is thus understood, Andrew Lattas argues, as a way of honoring dead relatives who, sympathies aroused, will eventually return the ''true price'' of their living kin's labor. These dead relatives, who live underground as white people, periodically surface in order to aid and guide the mission of Dakoa and his followers. Lattas suggests, then, that Dakoa and company repossess the agents of a foreign state, market, and church as partners, as harbingers of a future that promises full control of the peace and prosperity ineluctably associated with whiteness. Foreign agents thus provide Dakoa with the means-conceptual and practical-to realize a homegrown form of sovereignty.
In both of these cases, their very different histories notwithstanding, the economic and legal terms of capitalist social relations-profit, price, limited company-are revalued but not rejected. That is, a cash economy of foreign origins is encompassed within a moral domain premised upon domestic considerations of how people ought to relate to each other. Such encompassment is not total, stable, or even especially efficacious. It is, however, one mode in which Pacific Islanders negotiate gifts and commodities as well as the translocal (if not global) social relations that gifts and commodities mediate.
Negotiating Contracts (and Rights)
When Ranonggans dispute with each other about land, Debra McDougall tells us, the stakes involve not only-not even mainly-who owns the land, but also, and more important, who has the right and obligation to permit others to use the land. Here again, gifts are negotiated. What matters to Ranonggans is not the right to exclude others but rather the prerogative to include others. Put differently, the dispute hinges on recognition of one party as prior, as the origin of the gift from which the other party rightfully benefits. This recognition no sooner establishes a social difference between the parties to the dispute then it subsumes that difference within a relationship of unity and nurture between kin-people of the same kind.
The success of the Ranonggan social contract depends, in practice, upon its ambiguity-its managed dynamic of sameness and difference. The periodic assertion of difference is thus ideally oriented toward the achievement of a sameness informed by an ultimate value of love. Not unlike Dakoa's followers, who embrace their cult as a superior means for making love, Ranonggans value the sort of cooperation and harmony that they associate with both the best of indigenous tradition or custom and the moral precepts of an exogenous religion, Christianity. (Indeed, as Mar-garet Jolly emphasizes, Christianity in the Pacific can hardly be regarded as exogenous; it is the preeminent local(ized) language in which compelling claims of shared humanity and universal equality are advanced.) Love underpins a definite vision of community in which people live together in peace and prosperity. The question that McDougall's article raises-and that John D. Kelly's article extends-is then: To what extent do globalized regimes of contract law, regimes demonstrably favorable to the expansion of capitalist economic practices, enable and disable, sanction and challenge, this and alternative Pacific visions of community?
In the Solomons, as in other parts of Melanesia, the clarification sought by contract law with respect to land tenure upsets the flexible dynamic of sameness and difference, hardening and sharpening boundaries between social groups. Entification, as Thomas Ernst (1999) calls it, the creation of bounded corporate entities and individuated ''stakeholders'' with opposed interests, is set in motion by foreign agents pursuing aims as diverse as mineral extraction and marine conservation. These legal codes define the framework within which Ranonggans must negotiate if they want to enact their understandable desire to tap the wealth represented by foreign agencies such as the World Wide Fund for Nature, to exchange conservation for development. Under such conditions, which many people gladly welcome, it takes a certain heroism to keep sight of a vision of political community that does not take competition and enmity for granted-the heroism, as McDougall suggests, of women's groups and church groups in the face of the civil unrest troubling the Solomons-and Fiji (see Jolly)-today.
From the vantage point of post-coups Fiji, Kelly poses a related question of the extent to which globalized legal-political regimes effectively limit heroism. The question is quintessentially Weberian, the famous subject of The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism, by which account the heroism of the early Puritans gave rise to its own containment within an iron cage. In Fiji, it is a violent contest over the social contract-the national constitution-that has made explicit the ultimate values behind opposed versions of political community. As Kelly remarks, neither mana nor shanti are announced in any Fiji constitution; yet these words summarize the deeply entrenched assumptions-cultural values-that inform the contest over substantive justice being waged between factions of ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians. These values are themselves contingent products of encounters with foreign agents, bearing the impress of specific colonial histories. Thus, the British colonial procedures of codification in Fiji-especially codification of customary title to land-predispose some ethnic Fijians to assert difference: a hierarchy of distinct ethnic groups. By contrast, a history of Gandhian peaceful protest against British colonialism in India has predisposed some Indo-Fijians to assert sameness: a sacred and universal egalitarianism. This entanglement of colonial histories and cultural values-lived through the deliberate social action of willful agents-has informed a confrontation over the rights of subjects and citizens now entering its second century.
Kelly argues that the conflict over substantive justice in Fiji, like conflicts over land in the Solomons, plays itself out ''bottled up'' within the ''vessel'' of the nation-state. The nation-state, in turn, finds itself constrained by a network of global institutions designed to enforce formal (and highly restrictive) justice in regard to economic activity-a tight belt (or ''fiscal envelope''; see Rosenblatt) of planetary girth. Anyone familiar with the discontent and suffering generated by International Monetary Fund/World Bank structural adjustment programs in countries such as Papua New Guinea would have to concur (see Stiglitz 2002 for nonPacific examples). Not all contracts are negotiable, it would seem. Nor, then, should the negotiation of contracts necessarily be seen as (heroic) resistance to foreign models of citizenship and modes of production. From the perspective of the global regulatory order, such negotiation signals little more than locally quarantined and hence harmless social pathology. This is a grim assessment, relieved only by the occasional evidence that the vessel of the nation-state leaks, as when citizens of Papua New Guinea successfully seek justice by taking their claims against a transnational mining corporation out of the national courts and into the courts of the corporation's home country.
Negotiating Nations (and States)
Whatever things look like from outside the vessel of the nation-state, from within the vessel the questions of substantive justice and the definition of polity are argued, as Kelly says, with profound passion. No less so in New Zealand, Hawaii, or Vanuatu than in Fiji. Daniel Rosenblatt's account of Maori encounters with a settler state reprises themes introduced earlier in the discussions of negotiating gifts and contracts. Fundamentally, the attempts of Maori people to establish a relationship with the agents of a foreign state have been attempts to compel recognition of priority, that is, acknowledgment of Maori as people of the land. Such acknowledgment perforce defines governance (kawanatanga, a missionary neologism) as a matter of consent-freely given, but always conditional and hence subject to withdrawal. Put in local terms made widely famous by Mauss, the gift of government is the condition for retaining the inalienable treasures (taunga) that Maori deem ultimately valuable, as constitutive of themselves as a people. The gift of government, then, is an instance of what Annette Weiner (1992) saw as a pan-Pacific strategy for social reproduction: keeping while giving.
The sort of relationship that Maori leaders have sought with the colonial and postcolonial state in Aotearoa New Zealand is therefore not a matter of once-and-for-all negotiation; rather, it is the ground for neverclosed negotiations. Because consent can be withdrawn and legitimacy can be questioned, both need continual reiteration and performance. The situation here recalls the ideals of Ranonggan land tenure, in which the children and children's children of a deceased man must elicit the permission of the man's matrilineage (butubutu) to continue to use of resources rightfully under control of the man's sister's children. The situation, in other words, is one less like a contract-a done deal-and more, as Rosenblatt suggests, like a covenant-a promise that requires periodic validation.
The analogy of Maori negotiations with the state and Ranonggan negotiations over land goes further. In both cases, there is an assertion of social difference-the distinction between people of the land and foreigners, between hosts and guests-that no sooner than performed becomes reabsorbed within kin relations. Here then is the vision of Aotearoa New Zealand not as a bicultural nation composed of essentially discrete ethnic groups, but as a ''cognation,'' a single group of differentiated relatives. It is this vision-a response to living in a representative democracythat Maori intimate in their welcoming performances on the marae, itself a space whose contemporary significance in constituting social identities (such as hapü) derives from a colonial history of pacification and political reorganization. The marae thus functions as the social and physical space in which Maori enact their relationship to the state and thereby imagine themselves as a nation fashioned in terms of their own self-understandings.
Rosenblatt suggests that we think of the marae as something like a Maori public sphere, as a privileged space in which to gauge popular opinion about political relations in the modern nation-state of New Zealand. Jolly looks elsewhere-to poems and pamphlets, songs and chants-for expressions of how Pacific Islander women are negotiating narratives of nationhood and imagining political community in Hawaii and Vanuatu. The search exposes, again, the limits of heroism, specifically, how articulations of a strident anticolonial nationalism and confident postcolonial nationalism might both eclipse visions of gender equality. In this regard, Jolly looks at feminism and nationalism in the plural. How, she asks, do ideologies of exogenous origin-circulating in the global ''ideoscape'' (Appadurai 1990 ) with other forms of rights talk-come to be deployed in various settings? Thus feminism, an ideology often deemed foreign by Pacific Islander men and women alike, appears as alien and antagonistic in one setting (by one Hawaiian writer's account, at least) and as an ally and means for pursuing domestic agendas (in the eyes of one niVanuatu writer). These different responses cannot be wholly explained by the biographical details of the writers whom Jolly compares. Instead, as Jolly suggests, the difference must be indexed to the dissimilar positions of Hawaii and Vanuatu within a global circulation of not only ideas and ideologies, but also material and economic resources: military aid, tourist revenues, governmental and nongovernmental development organizations. How Pacific Islanders negotiate the gendered dimensions of national narratives is not a question of variation among essential cultural values (Melanesian egalitarianism and Polynesian hierarchy, for example); it is a question of unevenly experienced circumstances of colonization, formal political independence, and location within the global (cultural) economy.
Jolly's comparative approach complicates any easy understanding of the Pacific as a homogeneous culture area responding in uniform ways to some unitary phenomenon called globalization. Her sensitivity to how even individuals can quickly shift gears-the fact that Haunani-Kay Trask could change her mind about the usefulness of feminism for Hawaiian nationalism-likewise upsets any easy understanding of Pacific Islanders as motivated by perduring cultural values. Big questions ensue: Where, then, is the Pacific? When is the Pacific?
As these articles attest, an analytical focus on relationship and agency furnishes a perspective from which to address these questions. From this perspective, the dichotomies of global and local appear tired indeed. Impossible to separate one from the other in the first place or in any place, global and local are often elided with other dichotomies, such as Western and non-Western, modern and traditional, universal and particular. Sushi is non-Western but is it local? Christianity is Western, but is it global? Clearly, if we wish to retain the terms global and local-even if only as provisional terms with which to apprehend the social processes of contemporary history-making-then we ought to begin with the recognition that global and local are part of each other. To talk about the relationship between the global and the local as an external one between separate, independent realities is, in a word, wrong.
A focus on relationship and agency therefore casts the analyst's challenge of conceptualizing global/local (inside/outside, indigenous/foreign) articulations as an historical one rather than a taxonomic one. Of course, from the perspective of many people, including Pacific Islanders, history registers itself in the everyday form of taxonomy, of explicit categorical distinctions between the indigenous and the foreign. Thus, for example, the Japanese employ a pragmatically flexible but nonetheless unambiguous linguistic distinction between things Japanese (wa) and things Western (yo)-a distinction manifest, for instance, in the organization of department store displays (Tobin 1992) . Recognizing the historical contingency of the taxonomic labels requires unraveling the processes through which the labels and their referents were and are being produced and transformed. All this could be and has been put differently in Marshall Sahlins's (1981) well-known insistence that historical anthropology pay close attention to the structure of the conjuncture, the diversity of situations, now and in the past, in which agents motivated by different ends, endowed with different ways and means, negotiate each other and the unintended consequences of their encounters.
To this I would only add a corollary: negotiating globalization happens within structures of disjuncture as well as conjuncture, and these disjunctures also need attention. I refer here not to the disjunctures of ''flows'' in the global cultural economy that Arjun Appadurai (1990) has identified. I refer instead to something less abstract and more painful, namely, the failure to make relationships, a failure often experienced as exclusion and disconnection, a sense of nonbelonging bordering on what James Ferguson (2002) has called ''abjection.'' Such abjection is surely not absent-if not always front and center-in these articles. Consider the situation of the Indo-Fijians, whose very membership in the Fijian nation has been challenged by a succession of coups, and who choose voice over exit in their struggle to assert belonging. Or consider the motivations behind Dakoa's cult-his sense of frustration and of having been made a fool by the false forms of religion, education, government, and-not least-development foisted upon the people of Papua New Guinea by missionaries and representatives of the colonial and later independent state. Such a sense of disjuncture, I suggest, is far from uncommon in the contemporary Pacific, though the forms it takes are not singular. Let me elaborate and conclude with a brief story.
In July 2002, I visited the Tanga Islands, in rural New Ireland Province, Papua New Guinea, a place I had first visited in 1984 to do anthropological fieldwork for my doctoral dissertation. I was struck by the relative difficulty involved in getting to the main island of Boang, especially compared to my visits in 1992 and even my last visit in 2000. For one thing, whereas two airlines used to service the island with as many as seven flights each week, there was now only one flight to the island each week, depending upon whether there were enough paying passengers to make the flight worthwhile for the airline. For another thing, the flight was scheduled to pass through the island of Lihir on its way from and to the main urban center of Rabaul. Lihir-one of the most undeveloped parts of New Ireland Province in 1984-is today the site of a large gold mine; the island is connected to the capital of Port Moresby by nonstop jet service and to an array of global media outlets by satellite television. (I was told that Tangan men will sometimes make the voyage to Lihir to watch the annual State of Origin rugby spectacle, which pits a Queensland all-star team against a New South Wales team.) Tanga, by contrast, seems less connected than previously to the world beyond the horizon. The once busy cash-cropping industry has collapsed, making the infrequent visits of coastal shipping to drop off cargo and pick up copra more infrequent. Both the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation and the Copra Marketing Board no longer maintain an agent in Tanga, and the Catholic parish-once administered by American priests-no longer supports banking, retail, or copra marketing activities. Little money is in circulation, and basic trade store commodities such as rice and kerosene are in short supply. And while there are more boats with outboard motors on the island than ever before-a consequence of pig sales to newly wealthy Lihirians-these boats, when they have fuel, go astray with alarming regularity (their occupants have been rescued more than once by tying up their drifting boat to a pontoon owned and periodically checked by Asian fishing fleets). 2 It was a hardly a surprise to hear one man, a former seminarian, sum up the current state of affairs by saying plainly, in English: ''We are going backwards.'' And it was difficult to take any pleasure in the irony of reports that the newly elected provincial governor had allegedly promised to install satellite dishes in all the outer islands, including Tanga, thereby democratizing access to CNN.
What surprised me in all of this was how I was far more sobered by the current state of affairs than most of the Tangans with whom I spoke. In response to my entrenched modernist teleologies-according to which I could locate the present on a trajectory of decline-many Tangans offered an appreciation of historical contingency. 3 To my Marx they played Max Weber; against my ''despondency theory'' (Sahlins 1999) they juxtaposed a modest optimism. In retrospect, it is Tangans' appreciation of and openness to contingency that accords better with their own historical experience as well as the ethnography presented here. Over the past century, the booms and busts of copra, the comings and goings of various colonial administrations, World War II, the Lihir gold mine (just visible on the horizon), and myriad other changes, cosmological as well as political, have seemingly induced appreciation and anticipation of the unexpected. The present is not the future in embryo. Current disjunctures need not preclude future conjunctures. Much like the Vatukaloko people, for whom 130 years of legal separation from the land they claimed as their own did not extinguish the possibility of repossession, Tangans did not regard their options as foreclosed.
An appreciation of historical contingency has obvious implications for old narratives of development such as ''modernization'' or, more critically, ''commoditization'' as well as for putatively new narratives of globalization-and thus for how we answer the question of ''When is the Pacific?'' But it also has implications for how islanders and outlanders alike regard the Pacific Islands as a particular geographic area or region: not as a vast area of increasing marginality-the hole in the donut of the Pacific Rimnor even as, more positively, an ocean of vibrantly interconnected peoples (Hau'ofa 1994; see Jolly). Instead, the Pacific Islands come into view as a place where people with definite ends, informed by definite though not always shared values and historical circumstances, variously attempt with more or less success to make and sustain relationships and thus make histories. Through such initiatives, the contours of global and local, inside and outside are constantly reworked (see Jolly); new social networks are opened up and old ones expanded or shut down. This way of envisioning the Pacific will no doubt require new methods of study that produce new maps of translocal connection and disconnection (see Foster 1999) , but the techniques and insights of an historical ethnography open to contingency will continue to be indispensable to everyone negotiating globalization.
Notes
1 The conceit that different (ethnic) groups make different contributions and get proportional returns recalls the happy version of Adam Smith's explanation of the component parts of the price of commodities, in which the masters and their workers each contribute their distinctive gift (stock and labor) to the process of production. 2 In the eyes of some leaders or ''big men'' (kaltu dok), the sale of pigs to buyers from Lihir-an attractive source of cash in these depressed economic times-has had the effect of diminishing the scale of mortuary feasting that constitutes the heart of Tangan ''custom'' (kastam in Tok Pisin) (see Foster 1995). 3 Even the observation ''We are going backwards'' might indicate not a sense of inexorable decline, but rather one moment in a reversible, nonunidirectional movement. Ferguson (2002: 148) similarly suggests that Zambians speak of different parts of Africa ''in terms of nonlinear fluctuation of 'up' and 'down,''' as in ''Congo has been down so long, it is bound to come back up soon.''
